You know it’s gonna be a legit post when I have not one but
two hyphenated play on words in the title.
Oh yeah, that’s right Royals fans our GM made a move we can all be proud
of. Technically, he made two moves that
should make us proud. The signing of
Melky Cabrera in December of 2010 was universally panned. Even as low risk as it was, nearly everybody
saw no value in bringing in a traditionally overweight, underachieving center
fielder, who isn’t really a center fielder.
Not to mention, no more than 10 days later the Royals acquired a bright
young center field talent through the Zack Greinke trade in Lorenzo Cain.
Eventually Melky won the starting job, Cain was relegated to
AAA and the season began. What happened
was a career year for Cabrera. The
Melk-man put up a line of (BA/OBP/SLG/OPS) .305/.339/.470/.809 with 18 HRs and
87 RBIs. This was a career year for
Cabrera and makes him look like a borderline all-star. He didn’t walk much, but his strike rate
wasn’t outlandish either, he made a lot of contact and got a lot of hits. Having a .332 BABIP showed that it wasn’t as
much luck as you would think. It’s not
unheard of for a good hitter to pull off that kind of BABIP for an extended
period of time. However, someone like
Cabrera gives you doubts in that department.
All in all, Cabrera was near the top of the team while accumulating a
4.2 WAR.
This proved to be a valuable signing. By all accounts Melky was a positive
influence in the clubhouse and he was a positive influence on the field. He is not a “true” center fielder, he lacks
the range and athleticism the position requires, but he did an adequate
job. He didn’t make a lot of plays but
there weren’t many plays he didn’t make either (that he should have). He legitimately was worth the solid WAR he
put up for the 2011 season.
That value led to other teams inquiring about Melky for help
in their outfields. One of the teams was
the San Francisco Giants. Who knows who
initiated the trade but the Giants got Melky to bolster center field and the
Royals got Jonathan Sanchez and Ryan Verdugo (both LHPs).
Sanchez is an immediate upgrade of the Royals pitching
staff. That said, the Giants were buying
low on Sanchez. He was a legitimate
reason for the Giants World Series championship in 2010. That season he had a 3.07 ERA, a 3.94 xFip
(with a 4.00 FIP) so his ERA mark was a pretty accurate portrayal of how he was
actually pitching. He also managed to
strike out a nasty 9.54 batters per nine innings. This immediately makes Sanchez the best
strikeout pitcher the Royals have had since Greinke (assuming the light doesn’t
come on for Danny Duffy or Mike Montgomery this year).
The Giants are buying low on him because of his 2011
season. His most recent season saw his
ERA jump to 4.26 with a 4.36 xFIP (and 4.30 FIP). Again, his ERA showed a pretty accurate
portrayal. His strike rate stayed pretty
consistent with a 9.06/9 rate, but then it gets ugly. He had a career high walk rate of
5.86/9. This is awful even by Royals
standards.
This is the crux of why the Royals were able to get Sanchez
at such a “low” price. He has had walk
issues his entire career. He averages
allowing 4.78 BB/9 on his career. Now,
his K rate is up there at 9.36/9 for his career, but that can only help you so
much. Nobody wants to be in the business
of giving free bases.
There is also another factor at play here. Since Sanchez and Cabrera don’t play the same
position, they are not equitable. We
know Lorenzo Cain is now the owner of center field, but who will Sanchez boot
out of the rotation? My guess is that
Jeff Francis is out. This means that we
have to hope that the combination of Lorenzo Cain and Jonathan Sanchez is
better than Melky Cabrera and Jeff Francis.
First, let’s take a look at what Francis and Cabrera gave us
last year. A cursory glance at Francis’
stats makes him look like a poor pitcher.
He compiled a 6-16 record with a 4.82 ERA. However, a deeper look will tell he wasn’t as
bad as his stats showed. His xFIP was
only 4.29 and his BABIP was .316, slightly above his career average. He had a ridiculously low 8.5% HR/FB ratio,
which was no doubt helped by the pitcher friendly confines of Kauffman
stadium. He also had a solid 47.1%
ground ball rate. All factors that
contributed to his 2.6 WAR, despite his ugly W-L and ERA numbers.
With Cabrera’s previously mentioned 4.2 WAR that means the
two players combined had a total WAR of 6.8.
That is what will need to be replaced on this team. Despite what it looks like on the surface,
these two players were very valuable to the 2011 Royals.
Let’s look at best case scenario. In Sanchez’ best year (2010) he had a WAR of
2.4 to go with his 13-9 record and 3.07 ERA (shows you how valuable those stats
really are when they were that much better than Francis in 2011 and his WAR was
lower). If Cain is the player he was at
AAA last year, he will probably net somewhere in the 3.0 WAR range. If that scenario plays out we have replaced a
6.8 WAR with roughly 5.4 WAR. Seems like
a bad deal, but there’s more at play here.
First of all, we’re comparing supposed WAR with WAR from
last year. That doesn’t quite equate. Let’s look at this realistically and see what
we could expect from Cabrera and Francis in 2012 if they were a part of the
team.
Looking forward, I don’t know that we could expect a 4.2 WAR
again from a player who had a Career WAR of 2.5 going in to this past season. Let’s assume that Cabrera is 85% of what he
was last year. That would put him at .260/.288/.400/.688
with 15 HRs and 74 RBIs. This would put the
3.0-3.5 WAR in play. I don’t believe it
to be a stretch to say that Cain can duplicate, and possibly even improve on
those stats next year.
We’re going to do the same exercise with Francis. AT 85% of what he was last year we’re looking
at 5.67 ERA on 155 innings pitched with roughly the same record. I believe it’s safe to say that he would have
a WAR closer to the 1.5-2.0 range.
Sanchez can do no worse than that with his talent.
Let’s say that Cabrera gives a 3.0 WAR and Francis gives a
1.8 WAR, just to be conservative. That
puts us at a 4.8 WAR. Is it a stretch to
say that Cain could provide a 2.8 WAR and Sanchez a 2.0? I think both of those numbers are easily
achievable. This turns the trade into a
wash ultimately. So why make the deal?
Well, we’re giving up one year of control on Melky, who was
not going to sign again with the Royals, for one year of control of
Sanchez. We also got a minor leaguer in
Ryan Verdugo whom we control for 6 years once he reaches the majors. We also have control over Cain for 6
years. This makes the trade have much
more value to the Royals.
Outside the statistical analysis of the trade, I like it a
lot. Still. Sanchez may be a slight head case, but he has
top level talent. He has thrown a
no-hitter before. That type of “stuff”
doesn’t grow on trees. He has his
faults, such as less than ideal ground ball rate, but he has a decent HR/FB
rate which should only improve in the confines of Kauffman. Cain is a more than adequate upgrade for
Melky defensively and should be able to hold his own at the plate.
This is probably Dayton Moore’s best trade yet as Royals
GM. He sold high and bought low at the
same time. Maybe you can call the trades
equal but you can’t say the Royals got screwed.
Everyone knows what the Royals problem is, and Moore went and did
something about it. He got a high upside
guy who could factor into the Royals future, or at least be a decent one year
rental. He put another one of our young
players in the starting lineup. There is
not much to dislike about this trade.
That said, I certainly hope Moore is not done because Sanchez does not
make the Royals a contender all by himself.
Good analysis Jeff! I like the Sanchez+Cain v Francis+Cabrera angle. In that light, there is no way this trade doesn't improve the team going into next year.
ReplyDeleteI do want to add though, there is no possible way that Cabrera puts up numbers next year that are even close to this year. I say that his BABIP was a total fluke, and we were able to parlay that into a starter whom at his worst is an upgrade over our rotation this year. Consider that Cabrera has a career BABIP of .299, and his only other year (2006) above .300, led him to an BAvg of only .280. According to Fangraphs, his batted ball statistics are basically in line with his career numbers. Further, his BBrate plummeted to a career low 5% and his SOrate edged up to a new career high 13.3%. The man was pushed to be far more aggressive, and it worked out favorably. This is not sustainable change, nor a sudden awakening.
Great trade GMDM!
You raise a good point Shane. The BABIP was a fluke based on his career numbers, but it wasn't something outlandish at least like .380 or anything. Regardless, I believe you're right. I noticed your point about how he was super aggressive and it paid off, but is not a sound strategy. I think he toils in the .260-.270 range next year.
ReplyDeleteHis power doesn't look to be legit either as he has a HR/FB ratio roughly 50% higher than his career rate. This was definitely a good trade for the Royals.